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Lawrence Black, University of  York
How does history feature in and explain the British Labour Party’s recent past?
Labour’s current electoral and existential crisis was a toxic blend of  the ‘Brexit’ vic-
tory in the EU referendum, electoral collapse in Scotland, fallout from the Chilcot
Report into the Iraq War, an internal anti-semitism enquiry and, above all, the stasis
of  a leader in Jeremy Corbyn who was twice elected by local members (2015 and
2016), but not supported by MPs in the Parliamentary Party. ‘The political history
blues’ less takes sides in these woes than highlights disconnections between the uses
of  history within the Labour Party and in wider historical practice and writing. It re-
lates recent histories of  the left in 19th-20th century Britain, to the state of  modern
political history in general and the ‘Blue Labour’ initiative in particular. As a histo-
riographical intervention, it is not pessimistic - political history is a rich field, if  in
a methodological malaise - but notes less work identifies itself  as ‘labour history.”
Even as, paradoxically, debate about history within Labour was vibrant as the Blue
Labour (c.2010-15) project offered a nostalgic rediscovery of  Labour’s past to re-
invigorate the post-Blair party and policy and was stimulated by Corbyn’s surprise
election. The disjuncture between debates within academic history and about history
within the Labour Party is the article’s structural pivot. But it argues not for a precise
fit and for correlation as much as causation, even a certain opaqueness, in the rela-
tionship between the two. For left history, however imperfect the chemistry of
segueing academic and activist / policy uses of  history, the exercise discloses plenty
about both.
Wither Labour History? 
At the British Labour party’s centenary in 2000, labour history seemed a robust
sub-discipline.1 It was not at the crux of  methodological dispute as it had been a
generation before, when Eric Hobsbawm and Gareth Stedman Jones had pitted
materialist and linguistic approaches against each other by applying them to Labour’s
crisis with Thatcherism.2 But notably in Labour’s First Century, which dealt with then-
novel topics like gender and memory, it remained a vibrant site of  historical debate.
New Labour generated floods of  scholarship on how it governed, its language, po-
litical economy, foreign and cultural policy, ideology and how new it was.3 And it
stimulated work inflected by a New Labour paradigm on earlier periods—on charis-
matic, controversial leaders or when it had seemed out of  touch with a New Britain.4
But since 2000, such confidence has evaporated. Rumours of  labour his-
tory’s death circulated, obituaries were readied—was labour history, history?5 This
was related to disappointment with New Labour, opposition to the Iraq War from
2003, the familiar drift into economic crisis from 2008 and loss of  office in 2010.
Fair to say, Blair, Brown and Ed Miliband attracted a number of  friendly (i.e. left)
critics—from the outset a re-grouped Marxism Today derided New Labour’s language
and fanciful embrace of  the market.6 Would even revisionist Tony Crosland have
found New Labour congenial?7 (Ralph) Miliband-esque jeremiads in which Labour
compromised an electorate baying for a more red-blooded party were common.8
Historian Ross McKibbin was amongst New Labour’s most trenchant critics from
the pages of  the London Review of  Books. 
Such criticism was something labour historians would recognise in
Labour’s past. But this seemed less a divergence, more a qualitative break—as New
Labour’s political mission took it elsewhere and labour history struggled for vitality.
In its origins and classical form labour history was not a singular school. It combined
an interest in Labour and trade unions, and engaged with social histories of  the
working class—classically in Labour “movement” writers like G.D.H. Cole. Its pol-
itics were invariably partisan, if  a broad church, including Henry Pelling’s institu-
tional focus and Ralph Miliband’s holding of  Labour to a socialist standard. The
lines between political activist discussion and historical writing were regularly
blurred—as history was wielded to extol or attack contemporary Labour actions.
There was no singular relationship between politics and the discipline. Labour his-
torians tended to have peculiar politics compared to the wider electorate and were
less beholden to them than the party had to be. But the field in general shared a na-
tional focus and conventional approach (sourced from conferences, leading figures),
if  its subject was less established. Social history from the 1970s did bring to labour
history an interest in marginal, alternative activities and lifestyles, outside the official
movement. But fewer historians working on Labour politics, the working class or
collateral areas describe themselves as labour historians. They appeared a post-in-
dustrial rare breed. It was not, as the Blue Labour initiative showed, that there was
a lack of  creative interest in the party’s past. The past provided vital material and
context to segue with present-day policy-making, but not in ways that much involved
or animated labour historians. 
The wider left offered little respite. Deindustrialisation continued to trans-
form the working class, with trade union membership slowly falling—and for his-
torians who base politics on such social forces, this meant there was little strange
in the death, or dearth, of  labour history. The Co-op announced its biggest financial
loss in 2013, lost control of  the Co-op Bank to US hedge funds and saw its Chair-
man (until June 2013), Methodist Minister and Labour Councillor Paul Flowers, re-
sign amidst drug and sex scandals. The Socialist Workers’ Party, having survived the
end of  the Cold War and its interactions with George Galloway, faced allegations
of  rape cover-up from 2010. Its response, a defence of  Leninism and dismissal of
feminism, bourgeois legality and the internet (where much debate was conducted),
made Tariq Ali’s depiction of  the far left in Redemption look decidedly less satirical.
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As capitalism fractured, taking Labour down with it, the left (excepting Occupy)
clung to Ken Loach’s 2013 film The Spirit of  ’45, as a response to austerity.9
Labour history has lost several founding grandees and intellectual key-
stones: Hobsbawm, (Baron) Asa Briggs (Vice President of  the Society for the Study
of  Labour History until 2016) and of  a younger generation, Duncan Tanner. And
figures from its wider orbit, cultural points of  reference like Richard Hoggart and
Stuart Hall, have also passed.10 Key archives have encountered funding woes—the
wonderfully refurbished People’s History Museum, Women’s Library and Ruskin
College. The Society’s journal, Labour History Review, could seem pre-occupied with
debating the recently deceased (1920-91) Communist Party of  Great Britain
(CPGB). CPGB research boomed as UK and international archives opened after
the Cold War and generated some insightful studies into Communist and far left
identity and networks.11 But methodological innovation was not common, and the
boom can also be read as evidence of  the conceptual stasis and limited ambitions
of  labour history that newly available resources were so readily seized upon.12
Labour history’s difficulties were not unique to Britain; just as anxieties about social
democracy’s “retreat” or questions like “what’s left of  the left?” were to be found
across western democracies.13 Labnet, European Labour historians’ listserv since
1997, cited hugely diminished traffic as a reason for its 2015 closure.14
This was a crisis long in gestation. In 1982 History Workshop had added
“and feminist” to “a journal of  socialist historians”; in 1995 it dropped the subtitle
altogether. In 2002, the Welsh journal Llafur morphed from “Labour” to “people’s”
history.15 In 1994 McKibbin—updating Hobsbawm’s 1978 question “The Forward
March of  Labour Halted?”—had asked “is it still possible to write Labour History?”
Its certainties and categories challenged by post-modernism, feminism, anthropol-
ogy, and Marxism’s collapse, McKibbin answered not without equivocation, but af-
firmatively.16 In 2010 Richard Price turned in a virtual obituary when he reviewed
the field on the Society’s fiftieth anniversary. Labour History had from the 1960s
been an innovator. In 2010, Price found “much of  what I read was familiar… con-
ventional and staid.” “If  a Rip van Winkle labour historian had gone to sleep in
1980 and woken up in the labour history world of  30 years later,” Price felt, “it
would not take long for him to get up to speed on the historiography, he would not
have to learn a new vocabulary.” Compared to “the glory days of  the 1960s and
1980s,” Price encountered “little, too of  the conceptual experiment and debate.”
Nonetheless, Price commended a “transnational direction for the field.” Historians
should recognise how in attentiveness to the marginalised, it had incubated cate-
gories—gender, race—that were now undercutting it and “give thanks to labour
history for helping pare the post-modernist crusade against social history down to
size” in the 1990s (a battle Price was vocal in). Nonetheless, “the move away from
materialism as a basic framework of  historical analysis” and “fundamental shifts
in… the working class” undermined “labour history as it had previously been prac-
ticed” and “progressive politics as it had previously been known.” “As class went
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into demise in the political world” and “‘new’ Labour ... worked to cut its ties to its
earlier history,” traditional labour history’s prospects were diminished—“it was no
longer a magnet for innovative scholarship.”17
Price rather overstated the situation. Many commentators had already cited
a global turn in Labour history.18 In the USA (Labor History, International Labor and
Working-Class History), Australia (Labour History), Canada (Left History) and other
western democracies the field seemed robust. Class, the categorical mainstay of
labour history, remains central to debate.19 It never receded as much as some of  its
defenders protest, and has profited too from a post-postmodern re-turn to stress
the social context of  politics, non-discursive forces and material culture. Competitor
categories have meant Class Struggles, but it has many advocates.20 The complaint
that labour historians were “too easily satisfied by material explanations” was not
new. Nor did it mean that cultural approaches could not enlighten studies of  the
shop floor, as Saunders’s forensic study of  car workers (a cultural version of
Jonathan Zeitlin’s early industrial relations work) does.21
Whither Labour History?
But few would argue with Price that the political axis of  history has shifted away
from labour history. The politics of  history and method are now more hotly debated
in cultural and transnational histories of  sex, gender, emotions, consumerism or
political culture. These historiographical trends have enlivened Labour History, if
producing histories less likely to identify as Labour first-and-foremost. The trajec-
tory of  Labour’s First Century contributors Francis, Brooke, Fielding and Lawrence
discloses much. Martin Francis’ work on gender and emotional history has moved
away from politics. Labour (and labour history) awaits a full historical treatment of
their masculinity. The politics of  sexuality on the left have been subjected to Stephen
Brooke’s and Lucy Robinson’s analyses. And Julia Laite reminds us that work on
prostitution is as much labour history as the history of  sexuality.22 Other prolific
Labour historians have shifted to popular culture to source understandings of  pol-
itics—Steve Fielding on plays, novels and TV and Matthew Worley on punk and
fanzines.23 Part of  the story here was twentieth century history catching up with
groundbreaking works, particularly on nineteenth century popular politics by Jon
Lawrence and others. 
As political culture has emerged as an analytical topic and approach, tradi-
tional party-centred histories (Conservative no less than Labour) have lost favour.
The frame has been much more party competition and interaction—as Thorpe’s
local study of  Parties at War stressed.24 Studies of  conservatism (lower-case c) have
flourished by focusing less on the party (upper case) than on race and empire, cul-
ture, gender, New Right ideology, transnational perspectives, and micro-histories
of  local activism.25 But the shift should not be overstated. Much political history
remains traditional, institutional, party-centric: Thorpe’s history of  Labour entered
its fourth edition in 2015 and there have been numerous studies of  the 1960s Wilson
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governments (suggesting its stock is rising).26 And even where exploring roads less
travelled, like Griffiths’s study of  the countryside or Whiting’s of  taxation, a party
optic persists.27
Yet the trajectory is clear—with party politics understood not just in its
own terms but as part of  a wider culture, Jon Lawrence has considered its conduct,
performance and technologies in the interplay of  media, voters and politicians, and
how politics was consumed and perceived by the public.28 With the import of  party
not taken-for-granted or privileged, how it has related to the activism of  social
movements and NGOs has been vital in this re-situating of  politics.29 Another part
of  the appeal of  social movements was to find alternative paradigms for politics in
places other than establishment bastions like Labour. This also accounts for some
of  the interest in the CPGB, ILP and far left.30
Consumption has been another historiographically rich area. A resurgence
in Co-op studies chimed with a hope it was The Hidden Alternative to the economic
crisis—mutual, voluntary models were also in vogue.31 The Co-op’s 2009 Blowin’ in
the Wind TV ads were the first time Bob Dylan licensed his music for British ads.
As noted earlier, these prospects were disappointed—another illustrative mismatch
with historians’ energies. Still, the Co-op was exploited to explore working-class life,
business, and comparatively—and politically, as Gurney shows, as newer forms of
consumer social movement activism challenged its claim to speak for the con-
sumer.32
Others focused on the consumption of  politics, concurrent with the rise
of  “spin” and delving into Labour’s reception and reputation. Many show New
Labour’s presumed novelty had a longer history. Wring documents Labour’s pub-
licity and marketing since 1918; Beers its intimate relationship and concern with
inter-war modern media; Thomas the biases of  popular newspapers since 1945.33
A continuity here was Labour’s longstanding conception of  the press’s power to
frame debate, critically or favourably. There was then little news in the media’s 2015
role to labour historians. The Murdoch and Rothermere press, decreased print cir-
culation offset online, remained powerful. McKibbin argued “the press and televi-
sion were responsible for deficit fetishism” becoming viewed as an economic norm
rather than political choice, and portrayed Ed Miliband “more viciously than they
did Kinnock in 1992.” Although Gaber argues the Daily Mail attack landed less of
a blow on “Red Ed” (the red label having lost its lustre post-Cold War) than on
‘Odd Ed,” the out-of-touch embodiment of  a metropolitan, professional political
class.34
Besides consumption, imperial and transnational agendas have both left
traditional labour history looking parochial, and have proven a creative stimulus.
Eley’s epic connects the left to other European progressive movements.35 Compar-
ative work has offered a way out of  parochial Britishness, for instance in Favretto’s
work on Italy and Hilson’s on Sweden.36 Work on ethnicity, empire and the labour
diaspora has ranged across Zionism; representations of  the Attlee’s imperial ad-
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ministration; London as a hub of  1930s anti-imperial radical networks; and Hyslop’s
study of  J.T. Bain, the Scottish syndicalist, racist and founder of  socialism in South
Africa.37 The hybrid of  gender and transnational politics accounts for the recent
popularity of  Ellen Wilkinson.38 If  views from beyond Labour, from the periphery
not just metropole, have stimulated, so have those deploying longer-established
“from below” and local approaches.39
Another vibrant area and one which has retained a more conscious en-
gagement with present-day Labour is the history of  ideas. It remains important to
re-assessments of  the late nineteenth century mix of  ideas and hopes that, besides
the push for state action, Bevir argues Labour originated in. And it has offered a
varied and rich rethinking of  mid-century Labour revisionism. Butler’s work on
Michael Young’s focus on community and family, signals revisionism’s varieties.40
Works bordering political science offer historical perspective too. Bale’s study of
Ed Miliband’s leadership notes the usual leftward swing, but rare achievement of
unity after an election defeat. It now seems this unity after 2010 was born of  limited
authority, and relinquished in the 2015 leadership contest that disclosed differences
between members and MPs, cathartically releasing suppressed frustrations with
New Labour. Work on the unstable history of  Labour membership since the 1990s,
the sociology of  Corbyn’s supporters, and party structures also sheds light. Also
prescient here seems Toye’s version of  Tony Benn’s case that New Labour was an
elite project, “the smallest party in history.”41
The Political History Blues?
Part of  Labour history’s malaise is the broader impasse of  political history. Recent
overarching interpretations of  modern British history—Offer, Edgerton, Savage,
Todd—have cast politics more as a recipient than agent of  analysis. All profoundly
political books, they are not chiefly about politics.42 At the self-consciously paradigm
exploring 2015 Rethinking Modern British Studies Conference in Birmingham, politics
as a direct topic was scarcely to be found, except on a final day panel entitled,
“Whatever happened to political history?”
It is not just an increasing consciousness that politics has often been re-
garded pejoratively, or that anti-politics is a strong cultural strain.43 Rather it is that
the methodological developments spurred by engagement with cultural and linguis-
tic turns and Foucaldian ideas of  the variegated nature of  power in the “new polit-
ical history” of  the 1990s and 2000s have stalled. Its interest in the discursive
invention and symbolic imagining of  politics has been pared back by the reassertion
of  the social dimension and limits to political action; its interest in the wider recep-
tion and perception of  politics—its performance and communication—persists.
Critiqued for its propensity towards anthropological description and neglect of  the
hierarchies of  power or the agency of  the state, the “new political history” is no
longer new, certainly for those interested in producing more than a transcript of
official documents and their terminologies.44 The “new political history”—despite
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its best instincts—was always semi-detached from political science, to the detriment
of  both.  Such methodological action as there is, in areas like digital access to
sources, is replete with practical implications, but with its theoretical import more
tentatively broached.45
It is not, then, that novel work on modern British political history is ab-
sent, but that by comparison with, say Germany or the US, or earlier periods, it
seems methodologically quiescent, unconfident, or to take its cues from elsewhere.46
Surely other scholars do not look to it as a methodological touchstone in the way
they did in the heyday of  the “new political history”? The political zeitgeist has left
political history. Readman’s 2009 account betrays no little range of  output, but a
field methodologically placid, complacent, stale even.47 As noted around consump-
tion and transnationalism (and studies of  Communism), the supply of  research is
plentiful, but more self-consciously demanding approaches, rarer. Albeit evident in
Crowcroft’s study of  Labour elites that applies a “high politics” approach (at odds
with labour instincts) and in Robinson’s cultural approach that assesses party iden-
tities in the context of  wider British culture.48
Robinson segues the practice of  political history with Labour’s under-
standing of  its past. She holds that since the 1980s all political parties have grappled
with their self-identity and traditions—at one with British culture’s penchant for
heritage and the relativism of  post-modernism, whereby history taught lessons or
popular memory depicted it in contemporary terms. History as a discrete force, to
which parties had a distinct approach and revealed deep trends or difference to the
present, instead became a battleground of  current concerns. Marquand likewise ar-
gues that political culture has become presentist, and glib about but nostalgic for
the past (like Ishiguro’s memory-dissolving mist in The Buried Giant). Integral to the
construction of  “Old Labour” was a certain version of  history, one that New
Labour wished not to forget, but to distance itself  from. In the process, it erased
much. Fielding sees much the same in Loach’s Spirit of  ‘45.49
Whether Blue Labour demonstrates the ongoing value Labour puts by the
past or has made present-centred selections from it, what it certainly shows is that
history remained a vital political resource for debate and the detachment between
historians and Labour. The evacuation of  orthodox labour history signalled both
its historiographical exhaustion and Labour’s political project heading in different
directions, and Blue Labour—in that it was preoccupied with Labour’s past, but not
with labour history—exemplified this. Debates were conducted at the forefront of
Labour politics, but in terms unfamiliar to Labour history. Pace Robinson, one might
query how uniquely or strictly historical Labour was previously, or how intimate
Labour historians and Labour’s visions were (more often critically engaged than in-
timate friends). Conversely, as Jobson argues, if  more pronounced in Blue Labour,
nostalgia was not a novel cultural proclivity for Labour to be exhibiting.50
Corbyn’s emergence seems a UK variant on Syriza in Greece, Bernie
Sanders in the USA or Podemos in Spain, but also speaks to the resilience of  a
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more recognizably “labour history” version and vision of  the past amongst some
grassroots supporters. Not that the left has a monopoly on the past. Blue Labour
released a degree of  nostalgia for what New Labour might have been, and Corbyn’s
election has animated narratives of  battling the Militant Tendency in the 1980s. For-
mer leader Neil Kinnock invoked the party’s parliamentary purpose since 1906 in a
speech emboldening Corbyn’s truculent MPs against the weight the Corbyn sup-
port-group Momentum put by social movement models and rhetoric.51 Such ten-
sions between winning elections, beliefs and extra-parliamentary forces are age-old.
The point here is how mobilising the past is risky, if  history has different pasts, but
remains a highly valued tool in Labour debate. Arguably, all the more so as the speed
and spread of  social media has enabled nostalgia for a vividly imagined past, dis-
placed historians’ authority as a source for this, and disrupted the norms and con-
duct of  political debate. It is also worth remembering that Labour’s obsession with
its past(s) is not much shared by the electorate.
Blue Labour
Blue Labour was one of  several post-New Labour initiatives—like Progress’s The
Purple Book and One Nation—in the wake of  the 2010 election and the economic
crisis. It eschewed New Labour’s reverence for markets and shared its skepticism
about “old Labour” and unwillingness to revert to the state. The aim was to move
beyond the New-Old binary—recognising that what had been novel about New
Labour had become centralised and establishment. Blue signalled a nostalgic sense
of  loss and a conservative tinge (blue is associated with the Conservative Party), to
court controversy. The liberal-skeptic, faith-based alternatives to state and market
proposed by its key thinker, Lord (from 2011) Maurice Glasman, coincided with
Philip Blond’s Red Tory (an influence on “Big Society” rhetoric).52 Blue Labour made
limited headway outside (and inside) Labour confines. By 2011 the group had dis-
banded, the “blue” tag rendered toxic by Glasman’s comments on engaging the far
right and in May 2011’s Progress that Labour said too little about immigration and
ought “to put the people of  this country first.”53 But its debates and ideas retained
influence on the Jon Cruddas-led policy review. One Nation (another provocative
title, borrowing from Disraeli), which Cruddas inked with leading Blue Labourite
Jonathan Rutherford, exhibited numerous tropes of  Blue Labour’s understanding
of  past and present: the influence of  Glasman and Karl Polanyi; of  patriotism; con-
serving working-class community and family against market disruptions to which
New Labour had become habituated; and, like The Purple Book, pre-distribution, de-
centralisation and mutualism.54 Miliband was close to many of  these networks. 
This article makes no particular claims for Blue Labour’s significance—
some see it as a fleeting efflorescence now extinct, others as a persistent influence
on policy, especially in the context of  “Brexit” (2016) and the Scottish independence
referendum (2014), given its interest in community, nation and Englishness.55 What
Giddens saw in both Blue Labour and One Nation in 2013 as “more than a hint of
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nostalgia for a world that has disappeared, never to return” had in “Brexit” become
a future that some Blue Labourites could embrace.56 What is of  interest here are
the ways in which it understood and used Labour’s history as ammunition or as a
premise for policy-making. This sounds like an internal Labour dialogue or a relief
at re-engaging with history, even nostalgia, after New Labour’s strictures, but in
practice it was more partisan—combatting Red Toryism’s view of  community and
Liberal Coalition involvement. Blue Labour’s interests were those of  Labour his-
tory—class, capitalism, culture, community—but its theory and approach quite dif-
ferent. 
The Blue Labour manifesto was 2011’s The Labour tradition and the politics
of  paradox, assembled by Glasman, Rutherford, Marc Stears (Miliband’s speech
writer) and Stuart White (like Stears, an Oxford Professor). The first seminar was
held at University College, Oxford in October 2010. The Introduction sounded a
concern that “Labour had no shared interpretation of  its history” which was at
odds with many strands that Blue Labour toyed with from Labour’s past. On the
whole, the e-book maintained a fittingly open tone and showed how live a range of
historical questions—about beliefs, radical traditions, means and ends, Cole and
Tawney’s rehabilitation, Crosland’s demotion—were to Labour. On organisation,
Stears addressed “issues that mattered enormously to our party’s founding genera-
tions” and flagged keywords like “fellowship” and “relational” to convey how
Labour ought to practice its values.  Other tropes included: defending working-class
self-help and mutual traditions against imposed global markets; a “new economy”
post-2008, sustainable, humane (supporting the “living wage” campaign); and de-
centralising state power—differentiating Blue from New. Labour had become,
Rutherford estimated, too “disconnected from the ordinary everyday lives of  the
people” and needed to re-establish this relationship. If  not, “Labour is at risk of
losing England.” Others stressed the English radical tradition—Cruddas sang the
virtues of  Robert Blatchford and E.P. Thompson, White invoked “the spirit of
Tom Paine.” Its silences were as notable—Europe and EU liberal ideals were
scarcely mentioned, mostly to note Labour as an exception to social democratic
norms. Values of  family, home and nation gave this a nostalgic, even conservative
air. It embraced this seeming paradox, describing its project as “radical conser-
vatism,” that preserving what seems lost or threatened was as important as change
in mobilising support and in resisting commodification. Joining Britons’ long strug-
gle against dispossession and the alienating impact of  markets, “radical conservatism
shares this sense of  loss, a degradation of  human labour under the conditions of  a
profit-maximising capitalism” as White put it.57
For Glasman, Labour had become too liberal-dominated, focused on
change delivered by state-level experts, rather than true to its pluralist past, grounded
in the authentic reciprocal relationships of  working-class community. He stressed
that Labour was neither secular nor divided by religion, unlike much European
social democracy. Reestablishing a community base was not just nostalgia, but meant
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the London Citizens, churches and US style community-organising for the “com-
mon good” (Arnie Graf, a Chicago organiser, worked for Labour until 2013). Glas-
man held the Attlee governments and Crosland responsible for this turn in Labour’s
thought and practice from the varieties of  Cole, Laski, and the Co-ops to a cen-
tralised state that could redistribute and enable the good life. Jose Harris has argued
Crosland’s target in The Future of  Socialism (1956) was less austere Fabians than Laski’s
case that personal liberty and democracy were incompatible with capitalism. It
wasn’t just that Crosland seemed to have reached a truce with capitalism, as New
Labour’s take on free markets in the 1990s was about enabling participation in glob-
alisation rather than protection from it. Much of  this distaste for liberalism was its
penchant for general moral principles. “Labour values are not abstract universal val-
ues such as ‘freedom’ or ‘equality’,” Glasman asserts. Crosland’s focus on ends rather
than means, like New Labour’s embrace of  globalisation, left it talking in abstract
terms that might “apply in any country ... rather than developing the specific lan-
guage from within the political traditions of  our own country.”58
Polanyi, the Hungarian political economist and 1930s WEA lecturer is
Glasman’s lodestar. He offered an economic anthropology of  resistance to being
corralled by market practices, which resonated anew after discredited state socialism,
and as neo-liberalism faltered.59 In The Great Transformation (1944), Polanyi argued
that historically, self-regulating markets were enforced by the state rather than a nat-
ural order, and whilst wealth might be redistributed, the more fundamental challenge
was limiting the commodification of  labour and everyday life. To this end, au-
tonomous civic, voluntary, religious and democratic life were vital means. Resistance
to capital was thus in a reciprocal relationship with it (good for it, in short), however
much market utopians willed otherwise. This was about individuals, but not market
individualism or the abstract individual rights of  secular liberalism. Like Polanyi
(and Stears), Glasman highlighted Cole’s Guild socialism as evidence of  pluralism
and the value of  work.60
Glasman’s earlier work, Unnecessary Suffering, underlines these points. He
identifies labour as a cultural and political activity (referencing Biernacki’s work)
and plots the trade-offs between market and society in Britain from land enclosures,
poor relief, labour de-skilling through to the key modern paradigms of  the Second
World War and the New Left and Right.61 Glasman’s leitmotiv is the desire to pre-
serve human labour and relationships as virtues—with values not just value as price
or commodity. His resistance to commodification draws on Aristotle and Catholic
social theology besides usual left suspects.62 He praises West Germany’s social mar-
ket economy—its worker representatives, subsidiarity, co-determination, vocational
training, strong local government and banking—over more abstract economic
philosophies and policies. Balancing, regulating, and stabilising market forces re-
quires such non-contractual relationships, public goods, social knowledge creators
(schools, libraries), legal and democratic institutions, to preserve and renew. For
Glasman the paradox is that “socialism is a precondition of  a viable capitalism,” or
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as he puts it in The Labour Tradition, “a condition of  a sustainable capitalism.”63
Stears’ work relates closely to labour history interests. His first book ex-
plores debates between US progressive nationalists (Lippman, Weyl) to extend state
power, and UK socialist pluralists (Tawney, GDH Cole, Laski) to challenge it. More
than their differences over the state or how they map onto present-day communi-
tarian or associational theory (like Paul Hirst’s work), it was the shared values, aims
of  industrial democracy and tackling poverty, and terms of  this trans-Atlantic debate
that impress Stears. In their robust openness to others and negotiation of  adverse
social and political circumstances, he saw a counter to utopian-idealist and narrow-
pessimist theories. Equally, it differentiated Laski and Cole from New Liberalism,
wary of  1990s re-imaginings of  a “progressive alliance.”64 Demanding Democracy is
absorbed by how twentieth century American radicals debated a “new kind of  pol-
itics,” conscious that its behaviours might not be ideal for the future society. If  ex-
plosive, creative action was legitimate to enhance the existing order, this was not a
recipe for anything goes. New Left students, labour unions, civil rights campaigners,
and progressives weighed up strategy’s longer-term impacts on citizen’s virtues (a
Blue Labour keyword). For Stears, vital for “a democratic theory of  political action
in non-ideal circumstances is an account of  the political virtues needed to shape
the right response to those circumstances, a response that has the prospect of  im-
proving the democratic order, of  bringing the ideal closer to realisation.” He wanted
to move beyond realist democrats (too accepting of  how things are) and deliberative
democrats (too idealistic about how they ought to be). It is not hard to see in the
book’s concern with how radicals then and now sought to both “preserve the best
aspects of  the prevailing order and ... construct a better, fairer, more inclusive al-
ternative” connections to Blue Labour.65
As interventions in philosophy, Stears’s works do not always or directly
translate into contemporary politics. It’s not easy to recognise the radical riskiness
or street struggles of  Demanding Democracy in Labour. But it is evident in extolling
rangy debate and his Institute for Public Policy Research outputs on transcending
the market-state dichotomy.66 It is also evident in his interest (like Glasman) in Lon-
don Citizens, a coalition of  local community educational, ethnic, religious, trade
union groups that built relationships with community organisers often through in-
dividual confessional engagement. Such emphases differentiated it from New
Labour’s campaigning style, policy focus on the global and technocratic state and,
in insisting on its organisational potential to exercise political power, from the “Big
Society.” Stears suggested historians would recognise the focus on place, organisa-
tion and relationships in the works of  Tawney, Raymond Williams and Raphael
Samuel and urged Labour to “remember its own tradition.”67
This develops the idea that Crosland’s revisionism in the 1950s took a raft
of  Labour thinkers out of  Labour’s repertoire, along with more obvious targets like
ascetic Fabianism. In practice it elevated the Fabian faith in expert applied knowl-
edge to the fore in social democracy. One Nation briefly mentions Michael Young (a
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lacunae in Blue Labour’s reading of  Labour’s past, presumably because of  his in-
volvement with the SDP, where he set up a Tawney Society) as an advocate of  com-
munity-level engagement and social movement activism, about which Crosland was
warier, but engaged with. Other research on the “Pavement Politics” of  housing,
roads or playgrounds does suggest Labour was part of  the problem, if  also that the
initiatives and resources of  community politics were not as diminished as Blue
Labour contends.68 But One Nation argues that after 1951 Labour “did not choose
the path of  social renewal and active democracy”—instead “its politics were cham-
pioned by the small New Left.”69
Rutherford, who has written widely for Soundings on culture, emotion, and
masculinity, besides Labour politics, attempts to merge Blue Labour and the first
New Left (more indigenous, less influenced by Western Marxist theory).70 Both saw
English modernity and common culture as radical and conservative and the impor-
tance of  culture as a political resource. Amongst the New Left’s “key figures,”
Rutherford has Richard Hoggart, who was not an editor of  New Left Review or its
forerunners and contributed just a four page transcription of  a debate with Ray-
mond Williams to it. He notably omits Ralph Miliband, who was closely involved
editorially and contributed substantially, often on Labour’s shortcomings. One need
not read far into The Uses of  Literacy to find Hoggart warning of  the romanticisa-
tion—“the danger of  over-stressing the admirable qualities of  earlier working-class
culture” or leftism which “pities the ... debased worker, whose faults he sees as al-
most entirely the result of  the grinding system which controls him” and “admires
the remnants of  the noble savage, and has a nostalgia ... for such scraps of  them as
he thinks he can detect today”—to which both the New Left were and Blue Labour
are prone.71
The second New Left of  Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn was, Rutherford
regrets, defined by “the certainty of  their own historical analysis.” This sits uneasily
with some of  the cant Rutherford himself  wields about the “closing of  a specific
historical period,” centred on shifts in political economy in 1979 and 2008. One
could object that this is very certain and privileges political economy over culture
(pace the New Left), and it’s unclear that neoliberalism perished in 2008. Its intel-
lectual pretensions “detached the second new left from common English culture.”
Except, of  course, that Nairn was Scottish and wrote extensively on Scottish na-
tionalism—a topic about which Blue Labour, despite the independence referendum,
its 2015 general electoral meltdown, and concern with Englishness, is oddly reti-
cent.72 Rutherford regards this detachment as one of  the causes of  the New Right’s
triumph over social democracy in the 1970s. Even New Labour suffered from the
New Left’s elitism, leaving the “third way” to accommodate itself  to economic lib-
eralism in the 1990s. Like the New Left, Blue Labour claims to have the right ideas.
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Blue Labour’s Critics: Do its Politics and History Add Up?
The New Left analogy has been treated warily elsewhere. The radical patriotism of
Blue Labour and One Nation would likely have found a welcome from E.P Thomp-
son’s vision of  eighteenth and nineteenth century popular politics and in his battle
against the value put on imported Marxist theory by the second New Left. True,
Mike Kenny reckons, but Thompson would have been guarded against a sense that
this modern version “signalled too great an accommodation with political forms
of  conservatism” and was insufficiently part of  a “transformative politics in the
here-and-now.” And Blue Labour was divided in just this way over “Brexit,” with
Rutherford most positive about what he saw as a defeat for liberalism and oppor-
tunity to press native and cultural-identity concerns. Others—and one suspects that
First New Left—whilst no fans of  EU supra-state institutions, were suspicious of
a less internationalist, “little England” agenda.73
Other critics have been legion. Tribute, Blue Labour would have it, to its
energising of  debate. It was such a mesh of  ideas and eclectic traditions—anarcho-
sydicalism anyone?—that critics had plenty of  choice. Progress were sceptical of  Blue
Labour’s nostalgia and ability to resist globalisation. To its credit, The Labour Tradition
aired debate—notably Jackson questioning how contaminated Labour was by lib-
eralism or egalitarianism and showing its Gladstonian inheritance. Liberalism’s per-
sistent presence across parties and political culture, much as Blue Labour might
regret it, was discernible from the nineteenth century and constitutional reform to
neo-liberalism.74 Blue Labour conceived itself  as post-New Labour, recovering an
identity forsaken for slick PR, but if  “radical conservatism” was “an antithesis to
features of  New Labour,” White wondered what was the synthesis? Others saw blue
and new more in tandem.75
Much debate has been conducted in the journal Renewal. Finlayson found
“making sense” of  Glasman and his emergence as an “intellectual guru” hard to
square with Labour traditions and culture. Glasman would relish such charges, and
who prior to 2010 was discussing Polanyi in Labour circles? Even Glasman’s practice
of  delivering speeches, then published online, marked him apart. Finlayson reckoned
the conservatism, paradoxically, of  Labour party culture was likely to limit his im-
pact. Conservatism in the sense that issues of  national identity, race, religion and
the emotive ways Glasman discussed them ran against the grain of  Labour’s inher-
ited language and (electoral) instincts; in raising these issues Blue Labour hived them
off  from wider debate. Or in the sense that Corbyn’s election was a return to some-
thing familiar, showing Labour less bound by than moved by its past. Rooksby is
impressed by Blue Labour’s case that Labour had more of  an affinity with conser-
vatism than liberalism and the abstract ideals of  Fabians, Crosland and New Labour
had led it astray. Quite, if  also worth noting how parts of  the New Right were less
market utopians than opposed to this sort of  liberal establishment expertise and
pursuit of  change through abstract principles. Rooksby also contends socialism has
always been transformative and future-focused—and in this, shares much (more
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than Blue Labour allows) with liberal traditions. Socialism has not lacked idealistic
thinkers. And whilst Crosland is critiqued for rejecting the idea that capitalism was
inherently unstable and exploitative, Blue Labour themselves regard these as con-
tingent features of  speculative finance, rather than systemic.76
Blue Labour’s sociology was not lost on critics. In a pivotal phrase, Glas-
man conceived of  Labour as a “marriage between a decent working-class dad and
an educated middle-class mum,” in which from the 1940s the latter gained the upper
hand. Such gendered language was noted in Helen Goodman’s critique of  Blue
Labour’s sexism. Of  The Labour Tradition’s 24 pieces, 21 are by men.77 Graf  revealed
his amazement at the party’s difficulties finding a minimum wage worker to meet
Miliband. McKibbin turned on fellow Oxford academics, concerned that “the dif-
ference between the life-experience of  those who ‘advise’ Miliband and those who
vote UKIP seems now unbridgeable.” McKibbin stressed external forces as prob-
lematic for Labour—the challenge of  Scottish nationalism, the EU—but also its
insecure social base: “Glasman and the other proponents of  Blue Labour … call
for an ‘authentic’ working-class party uninfected by bourgeois social liberalism (no
pussy-footing on the issue of  race) … the class they wish to win back, the white
working class, is in steady decline.” Labour might crave a “Britain in which class
and party loyalty trumped everything else,” but that was (always) very wishful think-
ing.78
Other historians have weighed in. Jon Lawrence notes the tradition of
using history as a political resource: foundation myths, heroic biographies, and belief
in an inexorable forward march pepper Labour’s past. Blue Labour’s understanding
of  Labour made by nineteenth century mutualism and losing its way in the 1940s
as middle-class liberal intellectuals and the central state came to dominate, was, for
Lawrence, another myth. Or at best a reductive narrative of  complex processes and
factors. He reminds Blue Labour that not all turn-of-the-century working-class mu-
tual associations were pro-Labour or even “political”—many were Liberal and pos-
itive about state intervention. The idea that pre-1945 Labour was embedded in local
communities, unions and Co-ops was only the case regionally. This gave the sense
of  a movement, defensive more than oppositional, but was not a model that ex-
tended nationwide or into election-winning alliances. In deploying modern media,
addressing suburban, patriotic, Anglican and Tory workers and becoming a national
party, it was in 1945 that Labour became “Blue,” rather than lost its way. Nor was
it Labour’s post-1945 penchant for statism that eroded self-help traditions—not
least, this would accord Labour extraordinary power in shaping popular identities.
Other social changes and attitudes—consumerism, privacy, autonomy, apathy—ac-
count for the fate of  mutual institutions and cultures after 1945, and for popular
resistance to state initiatives to engineer civic sociability and participation. All told,
besides its geographic limits before 1945, the prospects for developing a nationwide
movement or constituency today mean mutualism remains insufficient.79
Lawrence is wary of  the easy dichotomies Blue Labour drop onto and ex-
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tract from Labour’s past. Glasman’s sincere attempts to denigrate liberalism in shap-
ing Labour are wishful (well, regretful) politics above all. Bad history does not nec-
essarily translate into bad politics, but it increases the risk. Lawrence is no naysayer
and notes how Stears has applied Cole and Laski’s values to contemporary individ-
ualism and choice, but also how this allows for the liberalism and anti-mutual in-
stincts Blue Labour professes aversion to. Stears suggests part of  his re-examination
of  associational pluralism was because “historians continue to overlook or misun-
derstand the detailed policy positions.” No doubt, but political scientists are prone
to discount inchoate popular understandings, even disinterest, in policy and politics.
There is a whiff  of  idealism in the notion that people are waiting, listening for pol-
itics to present a coherent set of  ideas and policies. It is wishful in imagining such
a close relationship between politics and people—blasé about what Lawrence terms
“the intractability of  everyday life,” the fluidities of  modern culture, persistent
“rugged individualism” (Savage’s term) or what Kevin Jefferys terms its “anaemic”
political culture since 1918. For all the evidence of  a politicisation of  cultural and
civic life since the 1950s, Britain’s remains not a very political culture, with good
reasons to mistrust politicians.80
Equally, Lawrence concludes with a case—derived historiographically
from the linguistic turn—for political language’s ability to shape popular attitudes.
Its power is not infinite—as discussed, it seems fanciful of  Rutherford to insist
Labour “become the creative meaning maker of  the people.” But it could influence
or contest “common sense” norms—contingent upon its language both resonating
with and shifting understandings of  popular experience. The point here is less the
proximity of  politics-citizens relations, than the ordering of  their respective
agency—and viewing them as interactive and relational. For New and Blue Labour,
popular attitudes were fixed and it was politics that had to adapt. New Labour’s
achievements were couched in terms of  existing interests, preconceptions and ne-
oliberal framing—efficiency and aspiration rather than fairness or inclusivity. Whilst
electorally successful, this left it politically vulnerable. Lawrence charges New
Labour more than Blue here since it could exercise both rhetoric and public policy,
but “didn’t even try,” paling by comparison with Attlee.81 But Blue Labour remained
beholden to public opinion, for example, on immigration. Whilst it approached in-
dividual well-being through communal efforts, it proved reluctant to challenge eco-
nomic norms after 2010. 
Language and narrative even figure in McKibbin’s critique of  why Labour
has been blamed for the 2008 crash and ensuing austerity. “Labour’s supposed over-
spending did not cause what happened in 2008,” but, “the Conservatives have suc-
ceeded in making people believe their version of  events,” to justify austerity,
downsize welfare, and embed neo-liberalism—not defunct or guilty—as common
sense. Liam Byrne’s missive on departing the Treasury in 2010, “there is no money
left,” became New Labour’s epigraph. McKibbin accepts that “given the now re-
ceived view of  its record” forged by the coalition, Blair and Brown’s successors
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were “always going to have trouble.” But “the stance it has adopted, fearful and
dominated by the ideas of  the city and debased neoliberal economics,” made Labour
complicit. It “nervously acquiesced in deficit fetishism, and so gave the game to the
government,” McKibbin adjudges, “Milband and Balls should never have allowed
the Tories’ claims to go unchallenged.”82 Blue Labour counter that polling showed
the message of  austerity and deficit-reduction had sunk deep into popular attitudes,
but that in essence was the point. Corbyn vowed to question their hold, but could
he forge an appropriate language, especially as the paradigm and rhetoric of  “Brexit”
superseded “austerity”?
The paradox for Blue Labour is that Corbyn’s 2015 (and 2016 re-) election
as leader demonstrates the multiple, conservative, even liberal-idealist cultures that
they had highlighted—Labour remains historically-minded, nostalgic even. And if
Blue Labour promoted nostalgia and community—reviving a sense of  a labour
movement outside as well as inside parliament—so did the Corbyn support-group,
Momentum, by explicitly talking of  social movement activism and with an appar-
ently clearer sense of  the agency needed to build such a movement. If  so, then there
are prospects for a revival of  traditional Labour history, and its accustomed lan-
guages; if  less of  recapturing the historiographical energies and trends that it fos-
tered, but which have left the original behind. Except—and it is a teasing
paradox—that much of  the energy of  newer political history has been invested in
social movements and an analytical approach and focus beyond parliamentary pol-
itics. If  Labour and historiographical trends have converged we can only provision-
ally tell if  this is more by coincidence or design. It would overlook the evidence of
detachment here to assume design, but underplay the vibrancy of  political history—
notwithstanding its methodological issues and labour’s history withering—to pre-
sume coincidence. Either way—and with the caveat that this relationship concerns
the electorate little—Labour looks set to engage historians for years to come.
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